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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate if stricter capital regulation creates negative shocks
in the loan market and if these shocks adversely effect Small and Medium sized Enterprises
(SME) access to external financing through the bank lending channel. This is tested through a
Difference-in-Difference (DiD) model, where loan volume and interest rates of SMEs are com-
pared to large firms in Europe from 2011 to 2016. The results indicate that there is a significant
difference in both loan volume and price after 2014 when Basel III was implemented. Contrary
to what was expected, the analysis show that SMEs seem better off after the implementation.
The increase in lending and decrease in price towards SMEs relative to large firms indicating a
healthier system. The mitigated effect of Basel III is assumed to be caused by factors such as
the SME Supporting Factor.
Keywords: SME, Bank Lending Channel, External Finance, Capital Regulation, Basel III,
SME SF
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1 Introduction
Small and medium sized enterprises (SME) accounts for 99,8% of all firms in the EU-28
area. The importance of SMEs to the social well-being is well recognized, as these enter-
prises employ more people than all the largest firms do together. Increased difficulties for
SMEs to access the funding they need to survive would have devastating consequences on
the economy, given the their importance for the economy’s well-being. Research on SMEs
and their access to external financing is still relatively new and suffers from data prob-
lems. The mapping by Berger and Udell (1998) provides one of the more comprehensive
overviews of the field, showing that bank loans serve as the main key channel for SME
funding. More recent data from the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises indic-
ate that banks together with the use of trade credit, still serve as the two most prominent
supply channels of finance to SMEs (ECB, 2017).
In the wake of the recent financial bank crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis,
policy makers were concerned that the effects of the crisis would severely impact the bank
lending towards SMEs. The implications were assumed to cause devastating effect for
the economy as whole, given the vital presences of SMEs in the market and their reliance
on the access to bank lending. In addition, stricter capital regulation was put in place
because of the crisis, which could also amplify the negative effects of bank lending towards
SMEs (Athanasoglou, Daniilidis, & Delis, 2014).
Previous academic literature have mainly focused on providing an understanding of the
institutions and markets providing funding for SMEs (Berger & Udell, 2006; Mayer, 1994;
Herna´ndez-Ca´novas & Mart´ınez-Solano, 2010; Petersen & Rajan, 1994), but in the recent
years the interest of understanding the negative impacts of capital regulation on SMEs
access to bank credit has increased (Humblot, 2014; Izquierdo, Munoz, Rubio, & Ulloa,
2017; Koehn & Santomero, 1980; Bernanke & Lown, 1991; Elliot & Willesson, 2018)
as well as SME experience of credit constraints (Casey & O’Toole, 2014; Mayordomo &
Rodriguez-Moreno, 2017; Farinha & Fe´lix, 2015; EBA, 2016). The long-run effects of
the increased capital regulation in general are however debated. Some argue that the
regulation will not spill over on the credit holders, but rather contribute to increased
stability in the banking sector and have significant social benefits. On the other hand,
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others claim that the increased capital requirements will have a negative effect on the
economic activity (Miles, Marcheggiano, & Yang, 2011; Mehran & Thakor, 2011; Admati,
DeMarzo, Hellwig, & Pfleiderer, 2014; Van Hoose, 2007; Peltzman, 1976).
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to further investigate if stricter capital regulation
creates negative shocks in the loan market and if these adversely effect SMEs access to
external financing through the bank lending channels. This thesis focuses on the supply
side of bank lending by using both lending volumes and interest rates, the scope is de-
limited to the European market during 2011-2016. To address the purpose, two research
questions are defined:
a) What are the effects of Basel III on bank loan volumes and interest rates in Europe?
b) How does these effects differ between SMEs and large firms?
This study extends previous work by moving beyond country-level evidence (Farinha &
Fe´lix, 2015; Izquierdo et al., 2017; Fidrmuc & Hainz, 2009; Humblot, 2014), allowing the
model to control for different institutions and financing cultures. Following EBA (2016),
Mayordomo and Rodriguez-Moreno (2017), Casey and O’Toole (2014), the research ques-
tions are examined by using a DiD model. However, this study estimates if Basel III
causes adverse effects on lending towards SMEs, where loan volumes and interest rates
of SMEs are compared to large firms during the implementation of Basel III. Whilst the
prior reports rely on SAFE data to identify dependent variables and firm characteristics,
this study utilize data from various data bases to include more variation and allows for
smaller changes to be captured in the model. The approach has not been estimated in
previous research and contributes to the existing literature with new insights about the
impact of stricter capital requirement on SMEs access to finance and the effect of SME
Supporting Factor.
This study finds evidence that the SMEs access to finance, in comparison to large firms,
have improved to a greater extent after the introduction of Basel III. One plausible factor
may be the SME support factor, which has facilitated lending towards SMEs. Con-
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sequently, this study is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to identify an increase in
access to finance for SMEs relative to large firms following the introduction of the SME
supporting factor (SME SF).
The thesis is structured as followed: Section 2 provides background information about
the importance of SMEs and the development of the Basel accords. Section 3 presents the
theoretical framework and existing literature from which the results and analyses will be
based on. Section 4 explains the model that is used to conduct the estimates, the variables
included and how the data has been collected and handled. In section 5, the results are
interpreted and the results are discussed in section 6 based on the theoretical framework.
Section 7, presents our conclusion and provides suggestions for future research.
2 Background & Definition of Key Concepts
2.1 SME
Every enterprise needs to start somewhere; in most cases as a micro firm. Research shows
that surviving firms then tend to grow, either organically or inorganically. A small frac-
tion of these firms grow to become large firms and several studies points to the access to
financing as an important feature for this to happen (Berger & Udell, 1998).
Following the majority of work on SMEs in Europe, we have utilized, the EU recommenda-
tion (2003/361/EC), stating that enterprises with less than 250 employees in combination
with a turnover less than €50 million or a balance sheet smaller than €43 million are
classified as SMEs. Figure 1 shows the division of European SMEs.
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Figure 1: Division of Firms by size in Europe
Micro (<10) 92.7%
Small (10-49) 6.1%
Medium (50-249) 1%
Large (>250) 0.2%
*Numbers in parenthesis represents number of employees
As illustrated, SMEs represent 99,8% of all enterprises in the EU-28 area and employs 67%
of the area’s workforce, which makes SMEs” ... the backbone of the European economy”
according to Muller et al. (2017). Furthermore, a positive link between the development
of SMEs and economic growth, in terms of GDP per capita, have been witnessed (Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, 2005).
As shown by figure 1, most companies remain small and constitutes the majority of
all firms in the European market. Despite the importance of SMEs to our economy,
information about them and their way of operations have been scarce throughout the
history of economic theory. Berger and Udell (1998) recognize that the growing interest
for SMEs and their financing began in the 1990’s with the development of the flourishing
innovative entrepreneurial sector, with companies such as Microsoft and Federal Express.
As a result, regulators, policy makers and academics began to be more attentive to how
the financial markets of small businesses were operating and how they were funded.
2.2 Capital regulation and Banking business
As credit providers, banks do in general play an important role in the economy as a special
type of financial intermediaries, where they operate both as lenders with a monitoring role
and provide liquidity to its customers (Rajan, 1996; Schmidt, Hackethal, & Tyrell, 1999).
The implications of these two separate roles is described by Gjelsvik (2017, p. 39) who
expresses it as: ”Note that banks are permanently facing the dilemma between a prudent
management of their funds (on behalf of their investors and depositors) and their capacity
to take risk”. However, according to Izquierdo et al. (2017, p. 3) the global financial
crisis resulted in ”... a regulatory tsunami in developed countries...” as a consequence of
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authorities’ goal to reduce the probability of future financial crises as well as a way of
managing the contraindicative roles of a bank. In Europe, increased capital regulation
and its impact on bank lending channels is of particular interest since banks provide more
than 70% of all debt in the market (Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, & Hirsch, 2018)
Basel III is an extension of the old framework Basel II. However, at the time of the an-
nouncement of Basel III, policy makers were concerned that SMEs would be adversely
effected by the increased in capital regulation. The issue being that Basel II introduced
a new internal rating-based (IRB) approach where SMEs in general were considered to
entail higher risks, causing higher ratings and thus higher capital recommendations than
larger firms (Henneke & Truck, 2006). Therefore, special treatment was allowed on loans
towards SMEs if the total exposure does not exceed e1 million between the parties where
the SME credit could be treated the same way as for private individuals. Henneke and
Truck (2006) continues by explaining that consideration was given to the benchmark risk-
weights (BRW), which impacts the RWA and thus also the capital requirements, since
there was a concern that credit conditions of SMEs might be effected negatively if banks
were subjected to higher capital costs. Consequently, changes in the BRW function were
made to reduce exposure for entities with a higher probability of default, such as SMEs,
in the final version of Basel II.
Basel III is the most recent accord and is the regulation in use today, and several comment-
ators have warned against the potential negative effects of this comprehensive framework
(Schwerter, 2011; Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2010). Basel III was announced in 2010
as a direct response to the financial crisis that started in 2007-2008, and was phased in
until legally binding for all banks as of the 1st of January 2014 (Niemeyer, 2016). Figure
2 illustrates the difference in division and increase in the regulatory capital when compar-
ing Basel II with Basel III. Figure 2b illustrates how the relative amounts of the different
kind of capital are altered, where the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) has increased and
Tier 1 as well as Tier 2 has decreased. Figure 2a shows both the new relative amounts
of CET1 and Tier 1 and 2 capital as well as the additional capital buffers, Capital con-
servation (CCB) and Counter Cyclical (CCYB), introduced in Basel III. The CCB has a
fixed relative amount of 2.5%, i.e. adding it to the previous total 8% of required capital
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and making the new minimum requirement of Basel III 10.5%. In contrast, the CCYB
is determined by the country in which the bank is operating in. The Basel framework
allows the CCYB to vary between 0-2.5% and was added since one purpose of Basel III
is to alleviate the pro-cyclicality of banks and increase the ”capital cushion”. This should
protect depositors and deposit insurers from losses in the event of isolated or widespread
bank failures. However, every country has the sovereign power to further increase the
total capital regulation. Although it may seem that the regulation of capital increased
substantially when Basel III was implemented, the BCSB in 2017 announced that even
further additions will be made focusing on the calculations of the RWA rather than the
leverage. The new additions are called Basel IV, and are to be phased in and expected
to be fully implemented by 2022 (BCSB, 2017).
Figure 2: Difference between the capital requirements of Basel II and III
(a) Change in CET1 equity (b) Additional capital requirements
*Diagrams are borrowed from Niemeyer (2016)
The SME SF is embedded in Basel III to compensate for raised concern about the impact
of capital regulation on SMEs. The SME SF was allowed by the Capital Requirements
Regulation (CRR) with an intention to avoid ”... a reduction in the flow of new credit
to SMEs” according to Izquierdo et al. (2017, p. 18). The SME SF allows for a capital
discount of 0.7619 to be made by the banks when lending to SMEs. The discount was
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decided by dividing the capital requirements of 8% in Basel II, with the new requirement
of 10,5% in Basel III (see fig. 2) which makes the calculation as follows:
SME SF ≡ Capital requirement of Basel II (%)Capital requirement of Basel III (%) =
8
10.5 = 0.7619
The intent was to neutralize the effects of increased capital requirements towards SMEs
and allow banks to keep the same level of SME lending as under the Basel II regulation
(Izquierdo et al., 2017). The idea of the SME SF seems to be a continuation of the
measures already taken in Basel II in order to facilitate lending toward SMEs. In order
to be eligible to make the SME exposure reduced by the SME SF, the characteristics
set by the European Commission are that the SME must have a turnover of less than
€50 million and the total exposure towards the banking group cannot exceed €1,5 million
(ECB, 2017).
3 Theoretical framework & Literature review
3.1 Information asymmetry
When looking at funding available through various markets, including the important debt
market, Berger and Udell (1998) state that ”Because of its informational opacity, small
business arguably is likely to bear a disproportionate share of the loss of funding that oc-
curs when there is a market failure”. The information opacity referenced is the theory
of information asymmetry in the market. This occurs when the symmetric information
assumption in the efficient market hypothesis fails to hold, information is asymmetric and
prices are distorted and do not achieve optimality in the allocation of resources (Quy-
Toan Do, 2004). Such asymmetry occurs when one agent in the market possesses more
information than others about the relevant aspects of the trade being made. The insider,
such as an entrepreneur or manager of an SME, has private information about the firm-
/product/service for which an outsider cannot observe.
Consequently, asymmetric information causes problems such as adverse selection, moral
hazard and agency costs. The outcome in the market could be a decrease in the lenders’
incentive to provide loans, essentially creating negative externalities in the market and
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making it inefficient (Tirole, 2006). Adverse selection arise before a loan is granted. An
outsider cannot differ between good or bad borrowers, hence the outsider must either rely
on the information received from the insider or increase monitoring fees and interest rates
for all insiders to compensate for the increased default risk. However, given that bad
borrowers are more likely to default on their loan they will be less affected by a higher
interest rate relative to high-quality borrower, which means that higher interest rates tend
to attract low-quality borrowers (Wollbrant, 2017). The problems of moral hazard arise
after a loan is granted and funds are being managed by insiders. At this moment, only the
insider has perfect information and gains full control of the funds. The outsider cannot
observe the insider’s carefulness in selecting projects, implementation of said investments,
or efforts to act in the best interest of the firm (Tirole, 2006). The outsiders face an
agency problem because of the probability of the borrower mismanaging the project and
increasing their private benefit instead of maximizing the profit of the firm (Wollbrant,
2017).
When the problem of moral hazard is substantial, external equity finance, especially angel
and venture capital may be particularly important. Before new ventures access signific-
ant amounts of external finance, they are often provided with angel financing and/or
venture capital, indicating that the moral hazard problem is particularly substantial for
these companies. When the need for external funding is high in relation to the insider’s
assets, including personal wealth at risk via pledges of personal collateral or guarantees,
the risk of moral hazard increases (Berger & Udell, 1998). The choice of external equity
or external debt is further affected by other arguments, for example, that external debt
can be chosen to maintain the control within the company while external equity can be
chosen to help share the risk with less risk-averse investors (Berger & Udell, 1998). Ber-
ger and Udell (1998) argue that the capital structure of small businesses is dependent on
the management, which for small firms in most cases are the owners, implying that the
agency problem does not exists but also introducing other factors impacting the decisions
on capital structure, such as the risk-aversion and preference in the control-ownership
trade-off in the firm when introducing capital from external parties.
In conclusion, the consequences of information asymmetry are many and have a great
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impact on the operations and efficiency of the market. The Basel accords constitutes as a
response to the existence of such negative externalities and market failures. In the follow-
ing section we will discuss how information asymmetry impacts the bank lending channel
towards SMEs in comparison to large corporations as well as how capital regulation is
theorized to effects the loan market.
3.2 Small Business Finance
Since the late 90’s, research on the importance and characteristics of SMEs has grown
exponentially. As part of this growing interest, Berger and Udell (1998) adds to the lit-
erature by providing a complete picture of how the private equity and debt market work
towards SMEs. By identify stages in the evolution of a firm and its need of additional/new
funding, they contribute with new insights of development and the financial growth cycle
of a firm (see A1 in appendix). As seen in figure A1, small and young firms are assumed
to rely on the bank lending channel and trade credit early on in the growth cycle.
The financial growth cycle presented by Berger and Udell (1998) is similar to the pecking
order hypothesis in the sense that it describes the financing preference of firms and that
certain types of financing are preferred over others. Although, such a discussion is insig-
nificant if considering the classic Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani & Miller, 1958),
which suggests that the cost of capital is unaffected by the choice of capital structure of
a firm. However, the theorem assumes a competitive economy with no external forces af-
fecting the outcome, making it less or not at all applicable in today’s economy. The choice
of external capital is therefore relevant, where the pecking order hypothesis claims that
internal financing, e.g. retained earnings and initial equity, are preferred over external
funds, such as debt and new issuance of equity. In addition, when the internal funds
have been exhausted and there is a need for external funding, it is also hypothesized that
debt funding is preferred over issuing new equity (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984).
The core of the hypothesis consists of the idea that there is no information asymmetry
when firms use internal finance or default free debt, a factor that is often associated with
external finance (Tirole, 2006). Empirical research has shown that SMEs act in accord-
ance with the pecking order hypothesis (Mateev, 2011; Zeidan, Galil, & Shapir, 2017;
Watson, 2002). More specifically, Mateev (2011) shows that there is a negative correl-
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ation between the profitability and the leverage of the firms, i.e. when the profitability
increases, the firm will deleverage and reinvest the profit rather than increasing their debt.
In contrast to the pecking order hypothesis, it has been shown that start-up firms move
from internally generated funds to equity directly. The motive being that debt requires
personal indebtedness which is not an as appealing alternative to entrepreneurs (Paul,
Whittam, & Wyper, 2007). Paul et al. (2007) provide two reasons to these findings in
terms of that entrepreneurs consider debt as a personal liability since it requires guarantees
signed by the individual themselves and that entrepreneurs prefer having a well-chosen
investor that can bring additional business skills and social capital (i.e. contacts and
networks), which increases the growth possibilities of the firm. Brogi and Lagasio (2017)
identifies an increased need to develop better channels for SMEs to gain access to equity
financing instead of bank-lending. The authors identify that funds supplied by banks
have shorter maturity than equity and that banks do supply credit to SMEs with a stable
leverage.
Contrary to Brogi and Lagasio (2017), the authors Berggren, Olofsson, and Silver (2000)
presents a contraindicative theory and identifies an unwillingness among SME managers
and owners to seek out new equity in order to grow. The authors argue that new equity
results in lost control to another external party. The trade-off between ownership and
control is dependent on the specific risk profile of the individual SME, leaving it difficult
to facilitate channels between SMEs and private equity investors. However, there are
new FinTech services on the uprising, that competes with the traditional bank lending
platform by facilitating the connection between SMEs and financiers (Oricchio, Lugaresi,
Crovetto, & Fontana, 2017).
Recent data provided by the Survey of Access to Finance in Europe (SAFE), allows for
a comparison between the theory about the external financing of SMEs and how they
actually operate. Figure 3a is based on this data and indicates that bank loans are the
most preferred source to access external financing throughout the entire survey. Trade
credit is the second most preferred channel to access financing for all years except 2014.
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Figure 3: SME demand and usage
(a) SME demand of different types of ex-
ternal funding
(b) SME usage of different types of external
funding
Figure 3b shows the source of finance among SMEs in the last 6 months, indicating the
relevance of the various external capital. Comparing the graphs in figure 3 shows a dis-
tinct difference in the preferred financing and the actual financing used by SMEs. Figure
3a indicates that bank loans are the most preferred financing but figure 3b indicates that
debt securities and trade credit is the most used. Lastly, figure 3a and 3b, reveals an
apparent decrease in both demand and usage of all sorts of external finance, before and
after implementation of Basel III in 2014.
The SAFE data indicates that lending from bank channels and trade credit are important
sources of funding for SMEs in Europe. One of the specific characteristics of the loan
market, is the existence of credit rationing, where Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that
even when the market is in equilibrium, credit rationing still exists in the loan market.
The implications being that the laws of supply and demand are subject to a specific set
of assumptions, where credit rationing is included. As SMEs are considered to be able
to provide less information than large companies, they will also, in theory, be subject to
more credit rationing than large firms. This is supported by Farinha and Fe´lix (2015),
that present evidence that credit rationing towards SMEs does exist. Also, the EBA
(2016) report finds that approximately 16% of SMEs in Europe experience trouble to
access funding via banks, whilst only 10% of the responding larger enterprises report the
same issue. The report also concludes that the issues with finding available channels for
financing grows larger for smaller firms, i.e. medium-sized companies experience less dif-
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ficulties than small or micro sized firms.
Although it can be argued that credit rationing exists in the market even though it is in
equilibrium, Mayordomo and Rodriguez-Moreno (2017) found that the SME SF alleviated
some of the credit constraints of medium-sized firms in Europe. The reason for that the
results only apply to medium sized firms is explained by the fact that medium sized
firms are considered to be more safe than small and micro sized firms (Mayordomo &
Rodriguez-Moreno, 2017). Figure. 4, which is based on the SAFE-data, supports this
finding, and indicates a decrease of credit constrained SMEs in Europe from 2014, i.e.
implementation of the SME SF.
Figure 4: Credit Constrained SMEs
3.3 Differences between SME and Large Enterprises
When describing SME credit availability, Berger and Udell (2006) argued that the con-
ceptual framework by academics was oversimplified. The critique mostly referred to the
classification of lending technologies being divided into two categories; (1) transactions
based lending and (2) relationship-based lending. The former relies on quantitative data
(hard data), whilst the latter use qualitative data (soft data). The simplification resul-
ted in research investigating the theory of that larger financial institutions have a focus
towards borrowers where hard data exists, i.e. more transparent entities, whilst smaller
institutions rely on soft data making their business more relationship based and therefore
directed towards smaller firms. It is this kind of relationship based lending which is theor-
ized to be used largely towards more opaque borrowers (Herna´ndez-Ca´novas & Mart´ınez-
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Solano, 2010; Petersen & Rajan, 1994), implying that information can be extracted from
building a relationship with the firm, where no hard data exists. As previously mentioned,
the debt of an SME could be personally guaranteed by the entrepreneur, so that the fin-
ancing of the firm is intertwined with the finances of the entrepreneur. This makes the
firm an opaque borrower, since the external funds are dependent on assets not included in
the balance sheets of the firm but on soft data such as personal creditworthiness and/or
reputation of the firm (Berger & Udell, 1998).
Given that SMEs rely mostly on soft data, Berger and Udell (1998) find that they, in
relation to larger firms, do not have the same access to public markets. Instead SME rely
on private equity and debt markets. Such a dependence makes SMEs more vulnerable
to changes in the market, if compared with large corporations who have access to more
financing alternatives 1. Furthermore, the EBA (2016) report suggests that the default
risk of both large firms and SMEs are strongly correlated with a cyclical pattern, where
default rates increases during downturns, although small enterprises are considered to be
riskier than large firm throughout the whole cycle (EBA, 2016). Brogi and Lagasio (2017)
argue that not even an aggressive expansionary monetary policy with negative interest
rates lead to more credit being given to SMEs. As discussed, SMEs are in general more
exposed to unpredicted trading and business cycles as well as trends in the economy or
sectoral specific changes. Consequently, access to working capital, by bank overdrafts, has
served as a go-to source in bad times (Acharya, Bharath, & Srinivasan, 2007; Fidrmuc &
Hainz, 2009; Ford C, 2016).
Since the SMEs access to public markets are limited and therefore lacking in amount of
hard data to correctly assess their credit, SMEs are in general considered opaque entities
relative to larger firms (EBA, 2016). According to the report by EBA (2016), modeling
the credit risk of SMEs are subject to various obstacles. One of them is that there is no
information on the current market value of SMEs, due to the lack of a liquid market for
SME loans. Portfolios containing bank SME loans, in general, includes large amounts of
small loans, leaving it difficult to distinguish individual assessments of specific loans. This
limitation of available information or reliance on more soft data, will amplify the effects
1Also shown in fig. 3b, where debt securities are shown to be the least used way of financing for firms
included in the SAFE data.
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of information asymmetry, i.e. issues with moral hazard and adverse selection, implying
that they could face credit rationing to a greater extent than large firms.
3.4 Implications of Capital Regulation on Bank Lending
The previous sections list various factors and characteristics that separates SMEs from
large firms as well as discuss their dependence of bank channels lending. We now turn
towards findings from prior research of how the increased capital regulation impacts the
lending of banks.
There are extensive ambiguity about pros and cons of bank regulation. According to
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the seminal paper is based on the market sorting itself out.
On the other hand, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that financial-market
liberalization could be part of the reason why financial crises have occurred more often in
recent history. Hellmann et al. (2000) suggests that, in theory, there is a straightforward
connection between the degree of moral hazard problem and liberalization in the market.
In comparison to the previous discussed moral hazard issue, problems in this setting refer
to the management of banks and their prudence in selecting assets to invest in. The au-
thors also claim that risk-taking by management (”gambling”) has a positive correlation
with competition in the banking sector.
Another explanation for tendencies and decisions to increase or to take excessive risks
by management, is to consider it as signs of positional externalities (Hirsch, 1977), i.e.
excess risk-taking by competitors may increase risk-taking by the individual bank. Such
kind of actions does not result in a more efficient market. In an illustrative example,
Hirsch (1977) points out that if everyone in a concert stand on their toes in order to
get a better view, nobody would be relatively better off than before. Without imposing
regulation, positional and negative externalities, such as a moral hazard problems, will
increase the risk taking by bank management. It can also be arguing that it was these
kind of externalities which created the highly levered bank entities of the recent financial
crisis in 2007-2008 (Admati et al., 2014).
Although the subject of the existence of capital regulation can be debated, it is gener-
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ally accepted among policy makers that the banking sector is subject to various market
failures and negative externalities. As a result, there is regulation in place such as the
Basel accords which aims to ensure financial stability (BCSB, 2010). However, there are
still concerns about capital regulation and one of them is the theory of how increasing
requirements might lead to higher funding costs for the banks. The increase might be
passed on to the borrowers in terms of higher credit cost and/or a decreased loan volume
and maturity. Lambertini and Mukherjee (2016) argue that interest rates will increase as
a consequence of increased capital regulation. Furthermore, Diamond and Rajan (2000)
claim that even though regulation brings financial stability, it also impacts banks’ ability
to create liquidity and their performance.
The above mentioned concerns are part of the ”negative NPV effect”, where various other
studies also contribute with different explanations of how increasing capital regulation
impacts the NPV of investments negatively, i.e. making the opportunities unprofitable
for the banks (Elliot & Willesson, 2018). All of the arguments supporting the NPV effect
are connected to the natural pro-cyclicality of the banking sector, i.e. when the economy
is good, more projects will be profitable since the NPV is higher and vice versa. The
issue is that in a good economy this could result in increasing risk-taking by banks, i.e.
issues with moral hazard grows larger. Therefore, given that the regulation in place is
risk-based, this cyclicality is theorized to be amplified by capital requirements increasing
the the negative NPV effects (Athanasoglou et al., 2014) .
Although Diamond and Rajan (2000) are critics of capital regulation and spokesmen of
the negative NPV effect as mentioned earlier, they also recognize that it has a stabilizing
effect on the financial market, i.e. capital regulation is not bad through and through.
As explained by Hellmann et al. (2000), although the outcome of the regulation will not
be Pareto efficient, it will force banks to internalize ”... the inefficiency of gambling.” by
requiring them to keep more of their own capital at risk. Therefore, counterarguments to
the negative NPV-effect also exist, where Mehran and Thakor (2011) argue that capital
regulation will affect the systemic risk of the financial system, but will not spill-over as
a regulatory cost to the bank owners or the provided credit. Admati et al. (2014) adds
to this perspective by consistently going through existing fallacies about capital regula-
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tion and concludes that the incentives behind every claim and statement is important
to understand. The authors argue that policymakers should be aware about opinions
that has a personal interest behind them and that the social benefits of capital regula-
tion should be considered, rather than private costs or benefits that are to be made by
specific institutions or people. Concurring with this idea is Miles et al. (2011) study on
large British banks, which shows that higher capital requirements have a beneficial effect
overall and conclude that a level of capital requirements even above that set by Basel
III, would be desirable. Mehran and Thakor (2011) continues the arguments against the
negative NPV effect, by theorizing that capital costs are calculated based on the capital
asset pricing model. Increased cost in equity financing versus loans is then neutralized
due to lower required capital risk premium. Increased capital regulation will thus affect
the risk premium of loans and equity, whilst access to new investment opportunities may
be financed by additional loans or equity.
There is still a continuous debate regarding the capital regulation, its social costs, benefits
and theorized implications to the loan market. The pro-cyclicality of the banking sector
and its connection to the negative NPV effect implies that an implementation of stricter
capital regulation might impact the NPV of investment opportunities negatively. This
leads us to the first hypothesis of this thesis, defined as followed:
Hypothesis I: Stricter capital requirements will have a shock in lending.
3.4.1 Impact of Capital Regulation on SME finance
As discussed in the previous sections, the issues and characteristics of SMEs access to
external finance and credit differs from what can be expected by large firms. In addi-
tion, capital regulation is theorized to have an impact on bank lending overall, however
this thesis also argues that it will have an adverse effect on lending towards SMEs. The
negative NPV effect could partly explain the existence of the adverse decreases in lend-
ing between different segments. An alternative theoretical explanation is found in the
crowding out effect. The crowding out effect differs from the negative NPV effect in the
assumption that capital restrictions forces banks to turn down loans even if the investment
would have been profitable, i.e. there is a strategic reasoning behind the decision that
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does not solely depend on whether or not the investments generates a positive NPV. The
theory suggests that increased capital regulation, bank capitalization and other economic
conditions caused by the restrictions, will force banks to turn down loans as a matter of
e.g. profitability or specialty knowledge in the specific sectors (Elliot & Willesson, 2018).
In the context of the recent eurozone debt crisis, Crosignani (2017) provides evidence of
weak banks having incentives to increase their holdings of domestic public debt at the
cost of crowding-out private lending. Such a reduction in issued capital require SMEs to
postpone investments or search for alternative investments (Elliot & Willesson, 2018).
Such consequences might result in increased difficulties for already credit constrained en-
tities or individuals to access financing as these borrowers are deselected (Koehn & San-
tomero, 1980; Bernanke & Lown, 1991; Abdel-Baki & Shoukry, 2013). Humblot (2014)
hypothesized that the implementation of Basel III specifically, would affect SMEs’ access
to bank credit negatively and argued that the smallest firms would be most negatively
affected by the then new set of reforms and face the largest decrease in their loan volume.
The author suggest that the cost of capital only impacts short term borrowings, indicat-
ing that a decrease in cost of capital due to an increase in equity volume can negatively
affect short-term credits. This suggestion supports the idea that banks can re-balance
their portfolios and reduce their least profitable exposures like SMEs’ short-term credit.
To conclude, information asymmetry permeates throughout the entire economic environ-
ment causing SMEs access to finance to be more restricted than larger firms because of
the opaque nature of the data they can provide. The impact of capital regulation on the
end-users has been discussed and theories such as the negative NPV and crowding out
effect will amplify the negative effects on lending to SMEs. A consequence that would be
devastating since SMEs are heavily dependent on the bank lending channel.
The aim of this thesis is to examine how increased regulation will effect bank-lending
towards SMEs. To test if increasing capital regulation does adversely impact opaque bor-
rowers more negative, the hypothesis of this thesis is defined as followed:
Hypothesis II: The shock is asymmetric and impacts SMEs more severely than large firms.
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4 Method
4.1 Model Specification
To test Hypothesis I and II, and investigate whether increasing capital regulations has
adversely impacted lending amongst companies relative to size, two models have been
defined. The reason will be explained in greater detail in the following sections. The two
null-hypotheses are defined as followed:
1) H0: Basel III has not adversely impacted lending volume towards SME and large
enterprises. . . .
2) H0: Basel III has not adversely impacted financing costs towards SME and large
enterprises.
where the corresponding models are estimated as followed:
IRi,t = α + β1SMEi + β2Postt + β3SMEi ∗ Postt + β4CapRegi,t + β5FirmChari,t
+ β6Macroeconomicsi,t + εi,t
(1)
logLVoli,t = α + β1SMEi + β2Postt + β3SMEi ∗ Postt + β4CapRegi,t + β5FirmChari,t
+ β6Macroeconomicsi,t + εi,t
(2)
where IRi,t and LV oli,t are the two dependent variables used as proxies, the former defined
by aggregated average interest rates, sorted by country, on loans to firms with a maturity
no longer than 5 years and the latter are aggregated loan volumes in a country per year
where the firm operates. SMEi is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm is
SME and zero otherwise, Postt is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all observation
after 2014 and zero before, SMEi*Postt is an interaction variable of the two previously
mentioned variables. Both models will be used to make a Difference in Difference estim-
ation, where the interaction term SMEi*Postt will be the one of interest when analyzing
the results.
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The table 1 shows the factors included in CapRegi,t, FirmChari,t and Macroeconomicsi,t
variables. The variables will be further described in the following section.
Table 1: Factors included as control variables
Common Equity Tier 1 (log)
CapRegi,t Tier 2 Capital (log)
Average RWA (log)
Shareholders’ funds (log)
Cash (log)
FirmChari,t Long-term Debt (log)
Creditors (log)
Change in Net income (%)
GDP (log)
Macroeconomicsi,t Unemployment (%)
Long-term Interest Rate (%)
4.2 Data
In order to test Hypothesis I and II, two null hypotheses have been defined with two dif-
ferent dependent variables, interest rate and loan volume. The dependent variables were
obtained from Eurostat. The data was obtained as monthly averages and converted into
yearly averages for each country in the sample. Following ECB (2014), loans in the range
e0.25-1 million have been used as a proxy for SME lending and loans above e1 million
have been defined as a proxy for large firm lending. Due to limited access to data, the
maturity of the dependent interest rate variable varies between the countries but does
not exceed 5 years, i.e. the sample has short to medium maturity perspective. Figure 5
indicates the average interest rate during the sample period for SMEs and large compan-
ies, aggregated across all countries. The graph shows that the SMEs pay a higher price
throughout the sample period, but also that the interest rates decreases rather steadily
for both parties, and the pace of the decease is the same.
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Figure 5: InterestRate
(a) Small and Medium Enterprises (b) Large Enterprises
Figure 6 shows how the dependent variables have developed over the time period. Figure
6a indicates that the loan volume to SME decreased from 2011 to 2012 and then steadily
increased from 2012 to 2016. Figure 6b indicates that the loan volume to large enterprise
decreased from 2011 to 2012, increased from 2013 to 2014 and then declined after 2014.
Figure 6: Loan Volume
(a) Small and Medium Enterprises (b) Large Enterprises
Data on bank characteristics are retrieved from SNL Financial. Four different measures
of the regulatory capital were used to capture the effect of Basel III: Tier 1 Common
Capital, Tier 1 Ordinary Equity, Tier 2 Capital and average total RWA. The figures are
EoY values from the balance sheets of the banks, from which a yearly average was cal-
culated for every country based on the origin of the banks’ operation. This average was
later merged with the firm characteristics based on country and year, i.e. every firm from
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e.g. Germany in 2012 has the same value on the bank characteristic variables attached
to them. Figure 7 indicates how the bank characteristic variables has developed over the
period (means are aggregated without irrespective of country). Consistent with the Basel
III requirement for more Tier 1 capital, the figure indicates that Tier 2 has remained
relatively unchanged over the period while CET 1 and Tier 1 has increased from 2013.
Average total RWA (in 10 000 000 units) has decreased from 2012 and increased in 2014.
Figure 7: Bank Characteristics
Information on firm characteristics are obtained using the Orbis database, the observa-
tions were randomly sampled by the database before the information were downloaded.
The definition of SME follows the EU recommendation (2003/361/EC), where enterprises
with less than 250 employers has been characterized as SMEs and enterprises with more
than 250 employers has been characterized as large enterprises. The final dataset consists
of 82 455 SMEs and 8 373 large firms, table 10 further presents the total number and
observations in each category and per county. Figure 8 shows how the firm characteristics
has developed over the sample time period for SMEs and large firms separately and inde-
pendent of country, whilst figure 9 provides more detailed descriptive. Figure 8b shows an
increasing trend in shareholders’ funds during the period for large enterprises, long-term
debt and creditors has remained relatively stable while loans and cash increased in 2013
and decreased in 2015. Figure 8a indicates that the long-term debt, loans, creditors and
cash has remained relatively stable over the period while there is an increasing trend in
the shareholders’ funds.
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Figure 8: Firm characteristics
(a) Small and Medium Enterprises (b) Large Enterprises
Data on macroeconomic variables were retrieved using Global Economic Monitor (GEM)
to obtain GDP and OECD to obtain unemployment rates and long-term interest rates.
The variables were obtained for each country in the dataset and merged with the depend-
ent variables as well as firm and bank characteristics.
Figure 9: Variable statistics
(a) Small and Medium Enterprises
(b) Large Enterprises
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The thesis is delimited to European countries during 2011-2016, an extension of the time
period was not possible due to lack of data on the dependent variables. Variables that
were obtained in an absolute monetary figure were natural logged transformed (see table
1), to summarize changes in terms of a continuous compounding. By natural log trans-
form the absolute monetary figures, we are able to capture small changes in the variables
and directly interpret them as percentage changes.
The regressions are based on an unbalanced dataset as some values were randomly miss-
ing in the dataset and firms with less than three observations during the time period has
been removed from dataset. A few large outliers, in terms of SMEs with inexplicable
high values in the firm characteristics variables as well as large firms with inexplicable
low values, were discovered in the sample. To keep them from skewing the analysis, they
were removed from the sample.
Some countries are merged due to lack of data in the dependent variables (see figure 10).
The implications being that firms operating in countries with lack of dependent variables
were matched with another countries with similar macroeconomic factors, banks charac-
teristics and economic conditions; in terms of GDP growth, estimated likeness in culture
and geographic position. Figure 10 presents the number of observations for each country
(or merger of countries) included in the dataset. The number of observations varies among
the countries, but the distribution of the firms is similar to the real distribution of SMEs
in the European countries (See A4 in appendix). For instance, Italy has a high number
of SMEs, i.e. they should have the high number of observations in the sample.
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Figure 10: Countries and number of observations
4.3 Model Estimation
Research suggesting that SMEs access to bank loans is affected by both demand and sup-
ply constraints (Abor, Agbloyor, & Kuipo, 2014; Cressy & Olofsson, 1997). Abor et al.
(2014) defines the supply constraints as factors such as informational asymmetries, higher
transactional costs and inherent riskier nature of SMEs, i.e. factors that makes it harder
for banks to supply loans. Demand constraints stems from factors such as inability of
SMEs to produce pro-forma statements and/or persuasive business plans as well as the
quality of the potential projects which qualifies for funding. Factors that SMEs them-
selves can control but that generally are hard to produce when seeking external financing.
In order to make good inferences from the results, it is necessary to try to distinguish
the demand from the supply factors and keep them separate. In practice, it is hard to do
since it is difficult to delimit supply from demand. There are also many factors affecting
both supply and demand, which increases the risk of omitted-variable bias.
The two main models that are estimated in this thesis have a supply side aspect in order
to answer the question whether or not capital regulation has a disproportionate impact
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on lending towards SMEs. To distinguish supply from demand, SMEs are separated from
large enterprises to capture differences in the capital structure within the two groups
and control for factors that cause informational asymmetry and supply constraints. In
order to compare large firms with SMEs, the chosen methodology is a Difference in Differ-
ence (DiD) model, following the methodology in the report by EBA (2016). In the model,
SMEs are treated as the treatment group and large companies as the control group. In the
report, two justifications are provided of why large companies are suitable to be defined as
the control group in comparison to SMEs. First off, the report mentions that the optimal
control group would be SMEs not effected by new policy changes, but since the regulation
was implemented in all EU countries, there are no SMEs that are not affected by it. This
argument is combined with the second reason, which is the fact that there is no way of
knowing how the financing of SMEs would have developed without the implementation
of Basel III. Furthermore, also following the EBA (2016) report, 2014 is defined as the
cut-off period from when the policy was implemented, i.e. all data from and including
2014 is treated as pre-treatment period.
SMEi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a SME and zero otherwise. Postt
is a dummy equal to 1 for the period after 2014 and SMEi*Postt is the DiD term of
interest. Year 2013 has been dropped from the dataset to control for the phase in period,
when banks could customize themselves to the new regulation. The obtained result should
then provide a better inference of the actual difference of a new policy. If the DiD-model
indicates that there is a significant difference between SME and large firm lending after
the cutoff, year 2014, the null hypothesis is rejected and indicates that Basel III have an
adversely effect on SME lending.
Even if other reports have used a DiD model to investigate SMEs access to external fin-
ance (EBA, 2016; Mayordomo & Rodriguez-Moreno, 2017; Casey & O’Toole, 2014), there
are three distinct differences between them and this paper. The first is that all reports
mostly rely on SAFE data to identify dependent variables and firm characteristics, whilst
the model in this thesis does not. The SAFE data is mostly reported as dummy vari-
ables, by utilizing data from other databases, more variation is included and allows for
smaller changes to be captured in the model. Furthermore, this thesis uses loan volumes
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and interest rates as dependent, instead of credit constraint among SMEs as the three
aforementioned reports. Lastly, this paper focuses on the increase of capital regulation
and the hypothesized adverse effect on lending and not the effects of SME SF specifically.
In order to have a proxy for the supply of financing through the bank lending channel,
this thesis follows articles by Lambertini and Mukherjee (2016), Acharya et al. (2018),
Khwaja and Mian (2008), where interest rate and loan volume have been used as depend-
ent variables. Unlike this paper, the reports do not make a distinction between SMEs and
large firms, but investigate the how shocks in the loan market (such as an increase in bank
capital) impacts firms in general. Also, the articles do not use a DiD estimation, however
this is due to the fact that a DiD estimation is a version of fixed effects regressions by
using aggregate data (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) and the articles could to a great extent
match their loans/interests with the banks and firms respectively, which is beyond the
scope of this thesis2. Therefore, the DiD method is suitable and both dependent variables
(interest rate and loan volumes) are aggregated at country-level in this thesis and using
the ECB (2014) definition of what can be considered a proxy for a SME lending, i.e. the
size of the loan, it can be applied to the defined model.
There is research emphasizing that availability of funds to SMEs are impacted by the
structures in both the financial and lending institutions of a nation (Berger & Udell,
2006; Galli, Mascia, & Rossi, 2017; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2004). As sug-
gested by Beck et al. (2004), institutions impact the availability of financing provided to
SMEs depending on the concentration of the financial market. Implying that, a more con-
centrated market decreases the availability of firm financing. The author also argues that
this effect is smaller for larger sized firms with access to capital markets. Given that this
thesis covers Europe, where institutions and financial markets varies across the different
countries, this issue is dealt with by using a panel dataset. The panel dataset controls for
time invariant and individual fixed effects such as the industry/country and unique risk
preferences. This characteristics of the model is important, given that the sample of firms
is from all over Europe and not a case study of a single (or a pair of) country (countries)
(Farinha & Fe´lix, 2015; Izquierdo et al., 2017; Fidrmuc & Hainz, 2009; Humblot, 2014).
2Banks nor firms are not very eager to provide or disclose such information and is hard to attain even
for a seasoned academic researcher
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To ensure internal validity of DiD-model, the treatment and control group have to ex-
perience similar trends in the pre-treatment period. The underlying assumption being
that in absence of adverse effects, the trends for large and small firms would be similarly
impacted by the new policy change. This is included in the assumptions in Hypothesis
I of this thesis. Furthermore, figure 11 indicates that the parallel trend assumption is
fulfilled and displays common trend in the pre-treatment period.
Figure 11: Parallel trends
(a) Interest rate (b) Loan Volume
In support of the use of the DiD model and responding to potential threats to the in-
ternal validity of the estimator the EBA (2016, p. 79) report states that ”... threats to
the internal validity of the difference-in-differences estimator cannot come from either
permanent differences in lending conditions between SMEs and large firms (e.g. SMEs
are, on average, more credit constrained than large firms) or shared trends (as these are
controlled for in the model). ”. Since this study uses the same method of defining and
regressing small and large firms and control for shared trend (e.g. macroeconomic vari-
ables), the above argument can be applying to this thesis as well. In addition, since a
DiD is a version of a fixed effects model, cluster standard errors are used to ensure the
internal validity of the model. These standard errors control for potential heteroscedastic
and correlation between the error terms over time between our countries (i.e. clusters).
The clustered standard errors allow arbitrary correlation within a country and provides a
consistent variance component estimation (VCE), even if there exists some serial correla-
tion within the countries or/and the disturbances are not identically distributed over the
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countries (Wooldridge, 2014; Arellano, 2003).
Bank, macroeconomic and firm characteristic variables are included in both models in
this paper to control for shared trends (see table 1). Following Lambertini and Mukherjee
(2016), bank characteristics was included to capture the implementation of stricter cap-
ital requirements. Unlike the aforementioned study, this paper utilizes logarithmic values
of the absolute regulated capital instead of ratios. Following the EBA (2016) report,
macroeconomic variables in terms of GDP and unemployment are included in the models
to control for macroeconomic conditions that is assumed to be correlated with the loan
volume and interest rates and demand conditions in the market. Hence the loan volume
is assumed to decrease during a downturn and vice-versa. To control for the downward
sloping trend in the dependent interest rate variable of model 1, a risk free long-term
interest rate, i.e. a government bond with maturity of ten years, is included.
Firm characteristics in terms of change in net income, long-term debt, shareholder’s equity,
accounts payable and cash are included as control variables for the demand. The change
in net income is included in the model to control for the volatility of the firm and therefore
a measure of the uncertainty or level of risk associated with it, which impact the decision
of a bank whether or not to grant loan applications. Other than the change in net income,
the remainder of the control variables are balance sheet items, since the aim of the thesis
is to investigate how financing of firms has been impacted by capital regulation. Long-
term debt and shareholder’s equity are included in the model to control for the firms’
capital structure and leverage, where higher leverage could decrease their possibilities to
be granted new loans and/or increase the interest rates to compensate for the higher
level of risk. As discussed in the literature review, empirical research has shown that
trade credit is an important source of funding for SMEs, i.e. a substitute for loan, and is
therefore controlled for in the model. For large firms the credit variable controls the fact
that there has been a recent credit crunch, i.e. even large firms could have had difficulties
obtaining funding through bank lending channels. The only asset included in model is
cash and, again, a reason for this is the credit crunch in order to control for decreased
demand in loans. The intuition being that variation in the amount of liquid assets can be
explained as taking precautionary measures when a firm wants to make sure they have
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enough liquidity to finance future investments (Almeida, Campello, Cunha, & Weisbach,
2013). Given the credit crunch, the economic outlook may have been such that firms were
vary about their possibility to obtain funding in the future, and therefore hoarded cash,
making it an important source of financing or part of their corporate finance strategy.
5 Results
Results for six different specifications of the two baseline regressions are reported in figure
12. Specifications (1) and (2) uses the loan volume as dependent to capture the effect of
Basel III on SMEs (1) and large firms (2) separately. Specification (3) and (4) instead
uses interest rates as dependents for SMEs (3) and large enterprises (4). Specification (5)
and (6) presents the DiD estimations, specification (5) uses the loan volume as dependent
and specification (6) instead uses the interest rate as dependent. Specification (1) to (4) is
used to capture differences in the capital structure within the two groups and control for
factors that cause informational asymmetry and supply constraint. While specification
(5) and (6) is the main regressions to capture if Basel III causes adverse effects on lending
towards SMEs compared to large firms during the implementation of Basel III.
Figure 12: Hypothesis I and Difference in Difference
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5.1 DiD Regression
The fifth column indicates that the average log loan volume for SMEs before 2014, the
pretreatment period, was 2.462% less than the average log loan volume for large enter-
prises before 2014. The column also indicates that the average loan volume for SMEs
after 2014 was 0.0684% more than the average loan volume for large enterprises before
2014. The interaction variable in column five indicates that there is a differential effect in
loan volume after 2014 for SMEs and large enterprises, the effect positive and significant
at a 0.01 significance level. Hence the interaction variable indicates that SME lending has
increase by 0.188 percent more than large enterprises lending after 2014.
The sixth column indicates that the average interest rate for SMEs before 2014, the
pretreatment period, was 0.00793 percent higher than the average interest rate of large
enterprises before 2014. The column also indicates that the average interest rate for SMEs
after 2014 was 0.00951 percent less than the average interest rate for large enterprises
before 2014. The interaction variable in column six indicates that there is a differential
effect in interest rate after 2014 for SMEs and large enterprises, the effect negative and
significant at a 0.01 significance level. Hence the interaction variable indicates that SME
interest rate has decrease by 0.00364 percent more than for large enterprises lending after
2014.
5.2 Bank Characteristics
Figure 12 indicates that all the bank characteristic variables have a significant effect on
the financing for both large enterprises and SME.
The first column indicates that a 1 percent increase in the CET 1 and Tier 2 increases the
SME loan volume by 0.324% and 0.289% respectively. A 1 percentage increase in the total
average RWA decreases the SME loan volume by 0.350%. The second column indicates
that a 1 percentage increase in CET 1 has a negative effect on the large enterprise loan
volume of 0.413%. A 1 percentage increase in Tier 2 and total average RWA variable
increases the loan volume for large enterprise by 0.108% and 0.205 respectively. The
third column indicates that a 1 percentage increase in CET 1 decreases the interest rate
for SMEs by 0.0219% and an increase in Tier 2 and total average total RWA increases
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the SME interest rate by 0.00552% and 0.0163%. The forth column indicates that a 1
percentage increase in CET 1 decreases the interest rate for large enterprises by 0.011%.
An increase in Tier 2 and total average RWA increases the interest rate for large enterprises
by 0.00706% and 0.00828%.
5.3 Control Variables
The table also indicates that trade credit and shareholders equity has a 0.01 significant
level positive effect on the loan volume for SME, while % change in net income has a
0.1 significant level effect on SME loan volume. Shareholders equity also has a 0.01
significant level negative effect on SME interest rate while trade credit has a 0.1 significant
negative effect on SME interest rate. Change in net income has an 0.05 significant level
positive effect on large loan volume. Shareholders funds and % change in net income has
a significant effect on large interest rate on a 0.05 and 0.1 significant level. An increase
in the macroeconomic control variables, GDP affects SME loan volume negatively and
has an insignificant effect on the DiD loan volume regression, but affect the rest of the
regressions positively, the effect is significant at a 0.01 significance level. A 1 percentage
increase in the control variable unemployment has a negative effect on the DiD regression
on loan volume and SME loan volume but a positive effect on the rest of the regressions,
the effects are significant at a 0.01 significance level.
5.4 Robustness Tests
The estimated models are based on a panel dataset, where companies with less than 3
observations are excluded from the dataset. By excluding enterprises with insufficient in-
formation, the risk of survivorship bias increases due to endogenous factors. The missing
values could be an indication that the companies has not survived, leaving a biased result
since they are removed from the sample. It could also be argued that companies that
disclose less are having issues with securing financing, excluding them from the dataset
might result in a biased outcome. To control for missing values that might cause selection
biases, the original regressions were estimated with missing values i.e. firms with 1 to
5 observations are included. By estimating the regressions with missing values, we are
allowed to control for the firms that were excluded in the original regression and verify
the correctness of the model. Figure A3 in appendix indicates that the results are verified
31
when all observations, including missing values and increased unbalanced panel data set,
are used.
In the estimated models there are a clear cut-off, at 250 employees, between SME and
large firms. This increases the risk of a misleading outcome since a firm with 250 employ-
ees is defined as large and a enterprise with 249 employees is defined as a SME. Hence,
if visualizing all firms as part of a spectrum ranked from smallest to largest, and then
drawing a line at what is defined an SME, the firms closest to the line at each side will
be rather alike. To control for this, a model was estimated where medium-sized firms
were dropped from the sample i.e. only micro and small firms were compared to large
firms in the DiD. As previously, the EU recommendation (2003/361/EC) definition of
micro, small and medium were followed, were enterprises with less than 10 employees are
defined as micro, 10 to 50 employees are defined as small and enterprises with 50 to 250
are defined as medium. By dropping the firms closest to the cut-off, the results may show
larger differences, which is why this is a good way of testing the robustness of our main
models. In addition, the cut-off between the pre- and post-treatment was altered using
2015 as the first year of treatment instead of 2014. Instead of using year 2013 as a control
for the phase-in period, year 2014 has been dropped from the sample to create further
variation in the model. Figure A2 indicates the signs and significance of the coefficients in
the DiD regressions remain unchanged as 2014 is used as phase-in period, medium sized
enterprises are removed from the sample and year 2015 is used as the cutoff point.
In order to further test the robustness of the model, an alternative model was estimated
from a separate data set. The model follows Casey and O’Toole (2014) and Mayordomo
and Rodriguez-Moreno (2017), where these studies are based on information provided
from the SAFE data. However, we combine the SAFE data with our Bank characteristics
to test if the results are robust and in line with our results, thereby strengthening the
validity of the result from the main DiD model. The model is defined as follows:
CCi = α + β1CET1i + β2T2Ci + β3RWAi + β4Ti + β5GDPi + β6UEi,t + εi,t
where CCi is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm is constrained and zero
otherwise, CET1i is the Common Equity Tier 1 held by a bank, T2Ci is the Tier 2 Capital
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held by a bank, RWAi is the average RWA during a year for the bank, Ti is a ranked
variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm increased their turnover, 0 if it is at the
same level and -1 if the turnover decreased. Lastly, the GDPi and UEi are the GDP and
unemployment of the country in which the SME operates from. Given that the dependent
variable, CCi, is a dummy the model is estimated by using a logit regression, inference is
made on the marginal effects and the sampling time period is 2011-2016.
This model using information from the SAFE data examines how regulatory bank capital
impacts the experienced credit constraint among SMEs, i.e. given the theory of negative
implications of tighter capital control, the supply of loans should decrease as regulation
increases and therefore have a negative impact on the experienced credit constraints of
SMEs. The results is presented in the appendix (see fig. A6) and indicate that during the
sample time period, an increase in the regulatory bank capital decrease the probability
of credit constraints among SMEs3. Consequently, the alternative model supports the
results found in our DiD model and indicates that the SME access to finance has been
facilitated as Basel III was introduced.
By creating variations in the method parameters, model specification and dataset, we are
able to evaluate factors that potentially are causing variability in the obtained results.
The different robustness tests verify the robustness of our regression, in terms of sign
and significance, and indicates that both the access to finance and financing cost has
facilitated after 2014.
6 Discussion
The Difference-in-Difference regressions implies that that there are statistically significant
differences in both loan volume and funding cost between SME and large firms. Both null
hypotheses defined in this paper are rejected, indicating that the increased capital regu-
lations have caused adverse shocks in the loan market. In contrast to what was expected,
the results imply that the loan volume has increased and funding costs decreased more
for SMEs relative to large companies in the post-treatment period. This implies that
3The results for all variables included in the model are significant at a 0.01 significance level.
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SMEs, after the implementation of Basel III are subject to less credit rationing by banks
in comparison to large firms.
The results are partly explained by examining the sample data. Figure (6), shows an in-
crease in loan volume towards SME after 2014, whilst the same figure depicts a diminishing
trend towards large enterprises. The same obvious discrepancy is not distinguishable for
the interest rate, but there is a clear downward trend for both SMEs and large corpora-
tions (see fig 11a). However, fig. 9, indicates that there is a substantial difference in the
interest rate, indicating that both SMEs and large firms has experienced a lower average
interest in post-treatment period. The figure also indicates that SMEs experienced a lar-
ger decrease than large enterprises and that the standard deviation, a rough measure of
the associated level of risk, is the lowest in the post-treatment period for SMEs. Both
figure (6b) and (9) underpins the results found in the DiD-regressions, that the access to
bank lending both in terms of price and lending volumes, has been more advantageous
for SMEs than large enterprises in the post-treatment period. These result contradicts
the notion of SMEs having a disadvantage to obtain external financing due to existing
information asymmetries and their perceived opaqueness (Berger & Udell, 1998).
Figure 4 shows a declining trend in credit constraint among SME after 2014, a result that
is in line with the above discussion. From an asymmetric information perspective, the
results indicate that the available information about SMEs has either increased or that
there is less information required by the banks when granting loans. However, it could
also be the simple reason that SMEs are more credit worthy in the post-treatment period
due to better economic outlook in Europe. Indicating that even though credit rationing
may exist in the market (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Farinha & Fe´lix, 2015), SMEs are not to
a larger extent effected by it compared to large firms.
The brightened economic prospect causes higher expected returns on business investment
for SMEs as well as large enterprises. In accordance with the negative NPV effect and
its connection to the natural pro-cyclicality of the banking sector, the opposite is true
when there are positive signals from the market, it will incentivize banks to increase their
lending, since their customers’ position and borrowing conditions becomes more attractive
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(Elliot & Willesson, 2018). Indicating that the increased capital regulation has not spilled
over as regulatory costs, as argued by Mehran and Thakor (2011), Admati et al. (2014)
but could have amplified the positive economic prospects as suggested by Athanasoglou
et al. (2014). Figure (8a) implies that long-term debt has decreased and the held cash
reserve by large enterprises has increased in the year 2014 and 2015. The capital structure
among large enterprises changed as the new regulatory framework was implemented, sug-
gesting there was an increasing concern about future opportunities to access bank loans
as suggested by Almeida et al. (2013). Increasing the reserve could be a response to the
recent credit crunch and by increasing their liquid assets, large firms ensure that they will
be able to fund future investments, regardless of capital regulation. Lastly, figure (8a)
indicates that in 2016, future prospect has changed to a brighter outlook among large
companies, as the accumulation of cash decreases.
The public market is an other channel for large enterprises to obtain financing, a channel
that is not accessible for SMEs. As the economy has been more stable and the future
prospects are positive, there might have been a period were large firms were returning to
the markets instead of relying on bank lending. This may explain why the loan volumes
has decreased for large firms after 2014, whilst increased for SMEs. A return to the cap-
ital markets would have resulted in a lowered demand for loans among large enterprises,
causing the decrease in loan volume, as shown in figure (6b). The drop in demand for
loans among large firms causing more room for SME lending, resulting in decreased credit
constraint among SMEs.
The above discussion with the increased loan volume shown in figure (6a), suggest that
the results could be linked to a reversal of the crowding out effect. Implying that during
the financial crisis and the credit crunch, there has been some crowding out happening
in the market, where large firms have been considered more profitable or strategically
”better” to supply with funds. The stabilization of the capital market has resulted in
less demand for bank channel lending and forced banks to reverse back to lending to a
broader customer base.
Although the loan volume and interest rates has become more advantageous for SMEs,
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figure (8b) shows a contraindicative picture when looking at the capital structure of the
SME sample. It illustrates that SME capital structure has remained relatively unchanged
over the period despite the increase in loan volume. The variable used as a proxy for SME
lending was defined by the size of the loan (ECB, 2014), i.e. loans under e1 million were
classified as small business financing. The results might indicate that it is not lending to
large firms per se that has decreased, but the amount of smaller sized loans have increased.
This could explain why the capital structure of the SMEs are rather stable throughout
the sample period, since the increase in loan volume is not going to the SME balance
sheet but rather to larger firms taking on smaller loans. Such an explanation would be in
line with the discussion about large firms returning to the capital markets, i.e. the need
of larger amounts of capital via larger bank channel lending may have been substituted
but there is still a demand for smaller amount of credit. Given that the SAFE data shows
SMEs becoming less credit constrained throughout the sample period, the theories about
the unwillingness of SMEs to use debt (Paul et al., 2007), due to requirements of personal
guarantees/collateral, may be applicable to further explain why the capital structure of
the SMEs has not changed as expected by the increased lending volume.
However, the most plausible factor for the result can be explained by the SME SF in the
new regulatory framework. The objective of the SME SF was to neutralize the potential
negative effects that Basel III would cause on the SME bank lending channel. In contrast
to the EBA (2016) our study identifies an increase in access to finance for SMEs relative
to large firms following the introduction of the SME SF. Our results indicate strong
evidence that SME financing was facilitated in the aftermaths of the implementation of
the new regulatory framework. Due to the great importance of SMEs to the well-being
of the economy, we consider it essential that the right SMEs have access to the funding
they need to survive and develop. SMEs are strongly dependent on bank loans, large
companies, unlike the majority of SMEs, have access to the public market and are not as
limited in financing alternatives. Therefore, we argue that the results indicate a healthier
system that will benefit the well-being of the economy.
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7 Conclusion
Basel III was introduced in response to the financial crisis with the objective to improve
the banking sector’s capacity to withstand shocks, strengthening supervision and reduce
the probability of another financial crisis.
This thesis investigates if stricter capital regulation creates negative shocks in the loan
market and if these adversely affect SMEs access to external financing through the bank
lending channels. The increased capital regulation in Basel III, was expected to create
adverse effects on the SME bank lending channel. The main reason for this expectation is
the existence of information asymmetry and that SMEs does not, in general, have access
to the public market and to a great extent rely on bank channel funding. The results
indicate that there is a significant difference in both loan volume and price after 2014
when Basel III was implemented. Contrary to what was expected, our study find evid-
ence that the supply of loans towards SMEs has increased after the implementation of
Basel III. Furthermore, the sample data descriptive and presented SAFE data provides
a good intuition about the results, indicating that credit constraints among SMEs has
decreased, loan volume increased and financing cost decreased towards SMEs.
This thesis contributes to the policy debate on how bank capital regulation affects the real
economy and provide useful insight to policymakers how the supply of loans is affected
by increased capital regulation. Furthermore, the results can also provide evidence of the
effectiveness of the SME SF, where this paper indicates that it has not only neutralized
the potential negative effects of capital regulation, but facilitated bank lending to SMEs.
Such results have not been found in any other previous report. The results found in this
thesis, create an increased need for further research to evaluate how the SME SF affects
SMEs of different sizes; micro, small and medium, to understand how the SME SF is ap-
plied and how it impacts SME lending. Consequently, given that SMEs represent 99,8%
of all companies operating in the EU-28 area, we assume that the significant results found
in this thesis should favor the well-being of the whole economy.
The method is based using proxies of SME loan volumes and interest rates, an interesting
extension of the study is to perfectly match the given loans and interest with the respective
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company and bank. Such an approach is beyond the scope of this thesis, but would have
contributed to a more robust understanding of the relationship of capital requirements
and the SME access to finance. Other suggestions for further research is to increase the
time period of the study, to capture the effects during different economic cycles, and
reassessing the analysis during the implementation of Basel IV.
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